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CONNECTION AND COHERENCE BETWEEN AND AMONG
EUROPEAN INSTRUMENTS IN THE PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
ELIZABETH B CRAWFORD* AND JANEEN M CARRUTHERS**
Abstract This article considers points of connection and coherence between
and among the Rome I Regulation, the Rome II Regulation, and Regulation
1215, and relevant predecessor instruments. The degree of consistency in aim,
design and detail of conﬂict of laws rules is examined, vertically (between/
among consecutive instruments) and horizontally (across cognate instru-
ments). Symbiosis between instruments is explored, as is the interrelationship
between choice of court and choice of law. Disadvantaged parties, and the
cohesiveness of their treatment under the Regulations, receive particular
attention.
Keywords: coherence, connection, continuity, disadvantaged parties, Regulation 1215,
Rome I Regulation, Rome II Regulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 17 December 2009,1 there have been two companion regulations,
furnishing for EU Member States rules of applicable law to govern issues
arising out of contractual and non-contractual obligations, respectively,
Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (‘the Rome I
Regulation’) and Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual
obligations (‘the Rome II Regulation’). The Rome Regulations, together with
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters
(‘the Brussels Regulation’), form a triangle of rules governing cases in all
Member State courts, in virtually2 the whole area of the private international
* Professor of International Private Law, University of Glasgow, Elizabeth.Crawford@
glasgow.ac.uk; ** Professor of Private Law, University of Glasgow, Janeen.Carruthers@
glasgow.ac.uk.
1 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations, art 28 (as amended by Corrigendum of
19 October 2009 (13497/1/09, REV 1, JUR369).
2 See exclusions from scope of instrument in Rome I Regulation, art 1.2 and 1.3; Rome II
Regulation, art 1.2 and 1.3, and Regulation 1215 (q.v.) art 1.2.
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law of obligations. In respect of legal proceedings to be instituted on or after
10 January 2015, the third side of the private international law triangle—the
jurisdiction and judgments arm—will be constituted by Regulation (EU) No
1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December
2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil
and commercial matters (recast)3 (‘Regulation 1215’).
This article searches for continuity in interpretation between and among
the Rome I Regulation, the Rome II Regulation, and Regulation 1215 and, in
the case of the Rome I Regulation and Regulation 1215,4 the predecessor con-
ventions;5 it also strives to identify among these instruments points of con-
nection and coherence as to substance, and to detect inconsistencies and gaps,
if and where they occur. Symmetry or asymmetry between Rome I and Rome II
will be scrutinized; points of congruence at the Rome/Brussels crossroads
noted; and symbiosis between and among the instruments examined. Dis-
advantaged parties, and the cohesiveness of their treatment under the Regu-
lations, will receive particular attention in Section IV.
II. CONTINUITY OF INTERPRETATION
One aim of the process of harmonization of the rules of jurisdiction and choice
of law in the law of obligations is the creation of consistency of interpretation
between and among the relevant instruments. This consistency in general aim,
approach, design, detail of rules, and meaning might be vertical (ie between/
among consecutive instruments dealing with and reﬁning the rules relative
to a given topic, such as exempliﬁed by the Rome I Convention/Rome I
Regulation, or the 1968 Brussels Convention/Brussels Regulation/Regulation
1215) or it might be horizontal (that is, cross-fertilization between instruments
dealing with related subjects, such as Rome I Regulation/Rome II Regulation).
As the cohort of instruments grows, there may be found both vertical and hori-
zontal continuity of interpretation, as for example, where a provision in an
applicable law instrument (‘the Rome family’) clearly derives from a provision
in a jurisdiction instrument (‘the Brussels family’), and may beneﬁt from the
interpretation accorded thereto in successive jurisdiction instruments.6
3 OJ 20 December 2012, L351/1. See for background EB Crawford and JM Carruthers,
‘Brussels I bis – the Brussels I Regulation recast: closure (for the foreseeable future)’ 2013 SLT
(News) 89.
4 On matters of jurisdiction and judgment enforcement, reference in this article principally will
be to Regulation 1215, but also, where speciﬁed, to the Brussels Regulation.
5 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters (‘Brussels Convention’); and 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable
to Contractual Obligations (‘Rome Convention’).
6 A form of parallel continuity is represented by the 1988 Lugano Convention on jurisdiction
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (horizontal continuity with the 1968
Brussels Convention), and by the 2007 Lugano II Convention (vertical continuity with Lugano I;
and horizontal continuity with the Brussels Regulation).
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A. Vertical Continuity
In civil and commercial jurisdiction generally, and in choice of law in contract,
there has been an historical progression from Convention to Regulation; and in
the case of jurisdiction, from Regulation to recast Regulation.
1. The Brussels family
By Recital (34) of Regulation 1215,
Continuity between the 1968 Brussels Convention, Regulation (EC) No 44/2001
and this Regulation should be ensured, and transitional provisions should be
laid down to that end. The same need for continuity applies as regards the
interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union of the 1968 Brussels
Convention and of the Regulations replacing it.7
This encompasses two aspects of vertical continuity: ﬁrst, the temporal scope
of application of each succeeding instrument, including transitional provisions,
and, secondly, judicial interpretation of the instrument where an identical or
similar form of words is found in succeeding instruments. Vertical continuity
in the second sense is readily seen in the evolution of jurisdictional provisions
from the 1968 Brussels Convention through the Brussels I Regulation to
Regulation 1215.8 Where a provision in a subsequent instrument is intended to
be equivalent in purpose to one in a predecessor instrument (allowing for
modest semantic reﬁnement), weight should be given to pre-existing decisions
of the Court of Justice of the European Union and of national courts, which
were interpretative of the earlier provision. General approbation of the princi-
ple of vertical continuity was contained in the Brussels Regulation vis-à-vis
the 1968 Brussels Convention, and is plain in Regulation 1215 with regard
to the Brussels Regulation and the Convention.9
Regulation 1215 follows the Brussels Regulation in structure, and the
content of a number of provisions is repeated verbatim, although many of
the core jurisdiction provisions have been renumbered, viz.: the general rule of
jurisdiction that a person domiciled in a Member State shall be sued in that
state is found in Article 4 (ex-Article 2); rules of special jurisdiction, providing
alternative grounds of jurisdiction at the claimant’s option, based on a
close connection between the court and the action, or in order to facilitate the
sound administration of justice are located in Article 7 (ex-Article 5);10
7 For vertical continuity between the 1968 Brussels Convention and the Brussels Regulation,
see Brussels Regulation, recital (19).
8 Equally, it must be borne in mind that evolutionary change in the core European instruments
may be deliberately eschewed in rules applicable domestically within a given Member State. See eg
Fishers Services Ltd v All Thai’d Up Ltd t/a Richmond House Hotel 2013 GWD 13-273.
9 Regulation 1215, recital (34).
10 Supplemented, however, by a new ground of jurisdiction in respect of civil claims for the
recovery, based on ownership, of cultural objects (art 7.4).
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the prorogation of jurisdiction provisions are to be found in Articles 25 and
26 (ex-Articles 23 and 24); the rules on exclusive jurisdiction are contained
in Article 24 (ex-Article 22); and the lis pendens system is set out in
Articles 29–32 (ex- Articles 27–30). Chapter III, concerning recognition and
enforcement, begins at Article 36 (ex-Article 33).
There are many examples of vertical continuity of expression extending
back to the 1968 Brussels Convention, such as the circumstances in which
consumer jurisdiction provisions are triggered,11 a point raised in 2009, by
way of reference from Austria to the European Court of Justice in Ilsinger v
Dreschers.12 The facts of Ilsinger were on all fours with Engler v Janus,13
decided by the ECJ in 2005 on the meaning and scope of application of Article
13.1.3 of the Brussels Convention, a provision which was substantially re-
enacted, ﬁrst, in the Brussels Regulation, Article 15.1.c, and more recently
in Regulation 1215, Article 17.1.c. Although the threshold wording in both
Regulations is somewhat simpler than in the original, all three instruments
demand that for the protective jurisdiction rule to apply, a contract shall have
been concluded by the consumer with a commercial/professional party.
In Ilsinger, it was necessary to decide whether Article 15.1.c of the Brussels
Regulation had to be interpreted in the same way as Article 13.1.3 of the
Brussels Convention in Engler, or whether the later provision might be inter-
preted diﬀerently by reason of its partially diﬀerent wording.14 Since the ECJ
already had departed from the principle of continuity of interpretation where
diﬀerences in wording between instruments were substantial,15 the question in
Ilsinger was whether the modiﬁed wording of the Regulation, combined with
strengthened resolve to protect consumers, justiﬁed a diﬀerent interpretation.
The ECJ observed16 that, since the Brussels Regulation largely replaced the
Brussels Convention, the Court’s interpretation of the Convention extended to
the Regulation, where its provisions and those of the Convention could be
treated as equivalent. The same approach can conﬁdently be expected to be
taken, should corresponding circumstances arise for decision under Regulation
1215. Where there has been vertical continuity of expression over three
generations of an instrument, this interpretative approach is likely to be more
entrenched still.
11 With regard to disadvantaged parties, the provisions in Regulation 1215 concerning insured
parties appear in arts 10–16 (ex-arts 8–14); those concerning consumers in arts 17–19 (ex-arts
15–17); and those in respect of employees in arts 20–23 (ex-arts 18–21). See further Section IV,
below.
12 Renate Ilsinger v Martin Dreschers, acting as administrator in the insolvency of Schlank &
Schick GmbH Case C-180/06 OJ 2009 C153/3, [2009] ECR 1-3961.
13 Engler v Janus Versand GmbH Case C-27/02 [2005] ECR 1-481.
14 See Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak, Renate Ilsinger v Martin Dreschers Case
C-180/06 [2009] ECR 00, paras 36–37.
15 Glaxosmithkline and another v Rouard Case C-462/06 [2008] ICR 1375.
16 Renate Ilsinger v Martin Dreschers Case C-180/06 OJ 2009 C153/3, [2009] ECR 1-3961,
para. 41.
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Yet a granddaughter instrument may depart from her ancestors in order to
bolster a principle or policy, by means of addition, deletion or substantial
rephrasing of a rule. For example, a signiﬁcant change eﬀected by Regulation
1215 is the extension of consumer-protective jurisdiction which, by virtue of
Article 18.1, may be established in the court of the consumer’s domicile, not
only against an EU domiciled defendant, or a non-EU domiciled defendant
having an EU-established branch or agency, but also against a non-EU domi-
ciled defendant. Likewise, by Article 21.2, a non-EU domiciled employer may
be sued by his employee in a court of the Member State in which the employee
habitually carries out his work, or last did so, or in the courts for the place
where the business which engaged the employee is or was situated.17 A further
example of departure from a predecessor instrument in order to strengthen an
accepted policy is found in Regulation 1215, Chapter III, Section 3. In the
Brussels Regulation, challenge, at the point of enforcement, to the jurisdiction
of the court of origin was extended via Article 35 to consumers and insured
persons, but not to employees. Under the granddaughter instrument, however,
such challenge is permitted if the exercise of jurisdiction of the court of origin
conﬂicts with Section 5 of Chapter II (jurisdiction over individual contracts of
employment).18
Evidence in favour of the embedding of a policy is the elevation of a
provision from a subordinate position, as part of a general article, to the status
of a bespoke, freestanding article(s), such as can be traced in the matter of
jurisdiction pertaining to individual contracts of employment, from Article 5.1
of the 1968 Brussels Convention, through Articles 18–21 of the Brussels
Regulation, to Articles 20–23 of Regulation 1215. But it is noteworthy that,
essentially, the wording and import of these elevated provisions have not
changed markedly over 50 years.
2. The Rome family
Turning to choice of law, there is no general approbation in the Rome I
Regulation of the principle of vertical continuity between that Regulation and
the Rome Convention, such as was contained in the Brussels Regulation with
regard to the 1968 Brussels Convention, and in Regulation 1215 in relation to
the Brussels Regulation and the Convention. Nonetheless, it would seem
perverse if vertical continuity did not operate in relation to identical, or broadly
equivalent provisions.
By way of example, the diﬀerence in import between the wording in the
Rome I Convention, Article 3.1 (‘the choice must be express or demonstrated
with reasonable certainty’), and that in the Rome I Regulation, Article 3
17 There is no equivalent extension of jurisdiction with regard to non-EU domiciled insurers
beyond the pre-existing ‘branch, agency’ concession contained in art 11.2 of Regulation 1215.
18 See further Section IV, below.
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(‘the choice shall be made expressly or clearly demonstrated’) is almost cer-
tainly a matter of semantics. Cooke J in Caterpillar Financial Services Corp v
SNC Passion,19 adhered strictly to the terms of Article 3.3 of the Rome
Convention when enforcing a contract of loan, Article 3.3 not being applicable
unless all pertinent aspects of the situation were connected with one other
single law.20 Although the language of Article 3.3 of the Rome I Regulation is
briefer than that employed in the Convention, the essence is the same, and in
terms of recital (15) of the Regulation, Article 3.3 should be construed in the
same way as was the corresponding provision of the Convention. In contrast,
Article 4.2 of the Rome I Regulation, though it gives to the ‘characteristic
performer’ of a contract a cameo role, does not cast him as a character of central
importance, as did Article 4.2 of the Rome Convention. Article 4, in its original
and later manifestations, is an interesting example of evolution, in that the
‘family likeness’ is apparent, but there are certain distinguishing features.
The extent to which there is signiﬁcant divergence between Articles 4 of the
Convention and of the Regulation marks the limit of inﬂuence of earlier
(national) interpretations.
Vertical continuity is exhibited to some extent with regard to contracts for
the carriage of goods. Recital 22 of the Regulation directs that the deﬁnition
of a contract for the carriage of goods, set out in Article 4.4 of the Rome
Convention, shall operate for the purposes of the Regulation. However, there is
a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in substantive treatment between mother and daughter
instruments in that contracts of carriage, both of goods and persons, are now
subject to a speciﬁc, discrete rule (Article 5) rather than being assigned a
subordinate position within the general applicable law rule in Article 4; in ad-
dition, in an important particular (the outcome should the principal rule fail),
the rule diverges in substance.
Material redesign of the mandatory rules tool is clearly to be seen in
Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation. The changes demonstrated by Article 9 are
more than cosmetic, in order to address the misgivings held by those states
which entered reservations in relation to Article 7.1 of the Rome Convention.
Article 9 constitutes a new approach to an old, important problem, viz. the
extent to which it is justiﬁable to permit as possibly determinative a law or
policy which is neither that of the lex fori nor of the lex causae.
Notably, with regard to choice of law concerning non-contractual obli-
gations, there is an absence of vertical continuity. In hailing the successful
completion of the Rome II negotiations, the European Parliament’s Rapporteur
made much of the fact that it was the ﬁrst time that a regulation in the ﬁeld of
19 [2004] EWHC 569 (Comm); [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 99.
20 The fact that the parties have chosen a foreign law shall not, where all the other elements
relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are connected with one country only, prejudice
‘mandatory rules’ of that country.
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judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters had come into being
without a predecessor international convention.21
B. Horizontal Continuity
Replication and reiteration of certain rules horizontally across instruments is
apparent,22 for reasons of principle, consistency and practicality. Horizontal
continuity may be expressly directed in an instrument, as, for example, in
recital (7) of the Rome I Regulation:23
The substantive scope and the provisions of this Regulation should be
consistent with Council Regulation (EC) No 44/ 2001 of 22 December 2000
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil
and commercial matters (Brussels I) and Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to
noncontractual obligations (Rome II).
Where a principle set in one instrument is imitated in another, the eﬀect is to
aﬃrm and consolidate that principle.24
Some repetition of principles across instruments is more than the mere
insertion of boilerplate clauses as, for example, the provisions in Rome I and
Rome II concerning mandatory rules. While Article 16 of Rome II clearly is
modelled on the mandatory rule tool contained in Article 7.2 of the Rome
Convention, because Rome II, ironically, pre-dates the Rome I Regulation, it
lacks an autonomous deﬁnition such as is provided by Article 9.1 of Rome I
Regulation. Article 14.2 of Rome II appears to be a progeny of Article 3.3 of
the Rome Convention, and so an argument could be made that a case inter-
preting Article 3.3 of the Convention legitimately could be used to interpret
the corresponding provision for non-contractual obligations. But the fact
that Article 3.3 of the Convention has been superseded by Article 3.3 of
the Regulation means that Article 14.2 of Rome II now must be construed in
21 <http://dianawallismep.org.uk/en/article/2007/063886/rome-ii-a-ﬁrst> .
22 eg in applicable law in obligations: Rome I, art 18 = Rome II, art 22 (burden of proof);
Rome I, art 20 = Rome II, art 24 (exclusion of renvoi); Rome I, art 21 = Rome II, art 26 (public
policy); Rome I, art 22 = Rome II, art 25 (states with more than one legal system); Rome I, art
23 = Rome II, art 27 (other provisions of Community law); Rome I, art 25 = Rome II, art 28
(relationship with other international conventions); and Rome I, art 27 = Rome II, art 30 (review
clause).
23 cf recital (7) Rome II. Regulation 1215 has no horizontal continuity provision.
24 eg in the subject of awards of damages in contractual and non-contractual disputes. cf Rome
I Regulation, art 12.1.c and Rome II Regulation, art 15c, both shifting power to ﬁx the award of
damages in favour of the lex causae. For background in relation to the rule in non-contractual
obligations, seeHarding v Wealands [2007] 2 AC 1; G Panagopoulos, ‘Substance and Procedure in
Private International Law’ (2005) 1(1) JPrivIntlL 69; JM Carruthers, ‘Damages in the Conﬂict of
Laws – the Substance and Procedure Spectrum: Harding v Wealands’ (2005) 1(2) JPrivIntlL 323;
and R Weintraub, ‘Choice of Law for Quantiﬁcation of Damages: A Judgment of the House of
Lords makes a Bad Rule Worse’ (2007) 43 TexasIntlLJ 311l.
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light of, and arguably consistently with, the equivalent rule in the Rome I
Regulation.
Horizontal continuity of autonomous deﬁnitions is not yet apparent.
Although there is growing incidence of the use of autonomous deﬁnitions
for the purposes of an individual instrument, there is little evidence yet of the
presence of deﬁnitions which are autonomous to the entire corpus of the
European regime of private international law. For example, the provision of
deﬁnitions of ‘habitual residence’ for the purposes of Rome I (Article 19) and
Rome II (Article 23) is noteworthy, but their use is strictly limited to the
purposes of the Regulation in which they appear.
C. Horizontal Consistency and Consensus
It seems not unreasonable to speculate that when a new provision emerges
in an instrument, assistance in interpreting it may be had not only from pre-
decessor instruments in the vertical line (if such exist), but also on the
horizontal plane, so as to ensure consistency and coherence.
In this context one may consider interpretation of the critical phrase in
Article 9.3 of the Rome I Regulation, viz. the ‘law of the country where
the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed’.
In interpreting Article 9.3, that is, for the purposes of applicable law, is it
legitimate to draw assistance from Regulation 1215, Article 7.1.b (ex-Brussels
Regulation, Article 5.1.b), directing that unless otherwise agreed the place of
performance of the obligation in question shall be, depending on the nature of
contract, the place of delivery of goods or of provision of services? It would
seem perverse for a judge vested with special jurisdiction in contract under
Article 7.1.b to conclude for choice of law purposes under Article 9.3 of
Rome I, that ‘the law of the country where the obligations arising out of the
contract have to be or have been performed’ was other than the place of
delivery of goods, or provision of services, as appropriate.25 Similarly, in tort,
the acceptance of jurisdiction by a forum on the ground of its being the place
of occurrence of harm, actual or threatened, under Article 7.3 (ex-Brussels
Regulation, Article 5.3) might be thought properly to inﬂuence that court’s
approach to the interpretation of ‘the country in which the damage occurs’ for
the purpose of Article 4.1 of Rome II. Recitals (7) of the Rome I Regulation,
and of the Rome II Regulation, respectively, seem to endorse such holistic
consistency of interpretation.
In contrast, in view of the reformulation of Article 4 of the Rome I
Regulation, it would seem a step too far to suggest that a judge may derive
25 Aﬃrmation of this interpretative strategy, to some extent, may be drawn from Rome I
Regulation, recital (17), which enjoins consistency of interpretation of the applicable law rule in the
absence of choice in contracts for the provision of services and sale of goods, and the special
jurisdiction rule in art 5.1 of the Brussels Regulation. This very connection between Rome I and
Brussels Regulation is attributable to changes in wording introduced in the Rome I Regulation.
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assistance from the ancestor choice of law instrument, the Rome I Convention
(which demonstrated a preference to identify as the characteristic performer
of a contract the party who was required to eﬀect the more active performance),
so as to support an argument that the place of payment would be a less
likely contender for ‘place of performance’ under Article 9.3 of the Rome I
Regulation than would be the place of manufacture and/or delivery.
While there is much evidence of harmony of intent, and of harmonious
intent having been translated into the construction of mutually consistent rules
across the Rome and Brussels instruments, it is possible nonetheless to identify
occasional discord. It may be permissible, for example, to cavil at the mismatch
produced by the conjoined eﬀect of Regulation 1215, Article 7.1.b (ex-
Brussels Regulation, Article 5.1.b) (special jurisdiction governing contracts for
the sale of goods, designating as the forum the place in a Member State where
the goods were delivered or should have been delivered—the buyer’s court, as
it were) and the Rome I Regulation, Article 4.1.a (leading to application of the
seller’s law, ie the law of his habitual residence). Thus, in a sale of goods case
where there is no party choice of court and no party choice of law, litigation
will proceed, harlequin-style, in the ‘buyer’s forum’, applying the ‘seller’s
law’.26 The combination of Brussels rules and those of Rome II produces a
related example, ﬂowing from the jurisdiction principle enshrined in Bier BV,27
which permits suit at the claimant’s option in the court of the place of acting or
the court of the place of resulting harm. Should the claimant elect to sue in the
former, the eﬀect of his choice will be that the (EU) court of the place of acting,
in the absence of choice of law by the parties under Article 14 of Rome II,
normally must apply the law of the country in which the damage occurs, irres-
pective of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred.28
Every private international law instrument is deﬁned in terms of material,
temporal, and territorial scope. The material scope of instruments is an impor-
tant aspect of horizontal consistency—what might be deemed consensus
between instruments. The regulatory jigsaw is being completed, and it is
necessary to ensure that each piece has its place and ﬁts with the others, and
that two pieces never vie for one space. One example of successful avoidance
of duplication of regulation is the exclusion from the scope of the Rome I
Regulation of obligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a
contract (Article 1.2.i), an exclusion which matches the express inclusion of
the rule in Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation for obligations arising out of
culpa in contrahendo. But this may be a little complacent, for there can yet be
jostling for position between instruments.29
26 In respect of franchisees and distributors, however, court and law appear to coincide.
Applying the bespoke rules in the Rome I Regulation, art 4.1.e and f, in combination with
Regulation 1215, art 7 (ex-Brussels Regulation, art 5), there would be a match between court and
law: the franchisee’s/distributor’s court and law will be selected.
27 Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA [1978] QB 708.
28 Rome II Regulation, art 4.1. 29 See below, Section III.B.2.
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D. Internal Coherence within an Instrument
Diﬃcult questions of characterization may arise in the application of a single
instrument as, for example, on the question whether a certain set of facts should
be characterized as falling within one rule or another, eg whether a contract is
one for the sale of goods or provision of services for the purposes of Regulation
1215.30 Rome I anticipates possible diﬃculties of characterization by pro-
viding, in Article 4.2, that where the elements of the contract straddle more
than one of those types listed in Article 4.1(a)–(h), the contract shall be
governed by the law of the habitual residence of the characteristic performer of
the contract. The same is not true of the tort-speciﬁc rules contained in Rome
II, Articles 5–9, since that instrument provides no ‘tie-breaker’ rule.
The interrelationship of provisions within a single instrument is signiﬁcant.
This is particularly true of Regulation 1215 and its predecessors. It is very
important to ensure that there is clarity as to which parts of a Regulation
are self-contained and which parts operate throughout the scheme of juris-
dictional rules. This is a matter of ranking and hierarchy. For example, the rules
of exclusive jurisdiction (Chapter II, Section 6: Article 24) (ex-Brussels
Regulation, Article 22) and the rules contained in Articles 15, 19 and 23 (ex-
Articles 13, 17 and 21) (party autonomy provisions relative to insurance, con-
sumer and employment contracts), take priority over the general prorogation of
jurisdiction provision contained in Article 25 (ex-Article 23). On the other
hand, Article 26 (ex-Article 24), itself subject to Article 24 (ex-Article 22),
overrides not only Article 25, but also is generally assumed to apply to dis-
advantaged parties,31 despite their special treatment elsewhere in the Regu-
lation. Likewise, the fact that the protective ‘codes’ contained in Chapter II,
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Regulation 1215 must be read32 without prejudice to
Articles 433 and 7.534 demonstrates that those ‘codes’ are not hermetically
sealed.
The interplay between Article 7.1 and 7.3 of Regulation 1215 (ex-Brussels
Regulation, Articles 5.1 and 5.3) is an area of some subtlety. The same is true
in relation to consumer contract claims/tort claims.35 The decision of the ECJ
in Kalfelis v Schroder,36 that the phrase ‘matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-
delict’ in Article 5.3 of the Brussels Convention must be regarded as an
30 cf under Brussels Regulation, Peter Rehder v Air Baltic Corporation (reference from the
Bundesgerichtshof, Germany) OJ 2009 C205/8; and Car Trim GmbH v KaySafety Systems SRL
(reference from the Bundesgerichtshof, Germany).
31 This is conﬁrmed by the softening of the rule in favour of such parties (speciﬁcally named),
per art 26.2. See Section IV.A, below. 32 Arts 10, 17.1 and 20.1.
33 Regarding defendants not domiciled in a Member State.
34 Special jurisdiction as regards disputes arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or
other establishment.
35 See eg decision of the German Federal Supreme Court in In Re a Mail Order Promise of Win
in a Draw [2003] ILPr 46. See Section IV. B, below.
36 Kalfelis v Schroder [1988] ECR 5565; [1989] ECC 407 (a case under Brussels Convention).
See also Source Ltd v TUV Rheinland Holding AG [1998] QB 54.
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‘independent concept covering all actions which seek to establish the liability
of a defendant and which are not related to a ‘‘contract’’ within the meaning of
Article 5(1)’, underpins the decision of the Irish High Court in Burke v Uvex
Sports.37 In Burke, the claimant sought damages for personal injuries caused
when the visor on his motorcycle helmet broke after he skidded and struck a
roadside in Ireland. The claimant framed his action solely in tort against two
defendants, both domiciled in Germany: ﬁrst, the manufacturer, and second,
the party from whom Burke had bought the helmet and visor, and with whom
he had, therefore, a contractual relationship. The court could not overlook the
existence of the contractual element,38 with the result that it could not properly
take jurisdiction over the second defendant on the basis of Article 5.3 (occur-
rence of the delict in Ireland). It did not matter that in these circumstances, by
the national law of Ireland, the contractual element of the claim did not
foreclose a claim in tort; nor could account be taken of the possible detriment to
the claimant if, as a result of time limitation rules, he was unable to sue the
second defendant in Germany under Article 2.39
III. SYMBIOSIS BETWEEN INSTRUMENTS
A. Rome I and Rome II, Chapter II (Torts/Delicts)
An investigation into coherence within and between instruments can be
extended to an examination of the symbiotic relationship between instruments.
To what extent does the applicable law identiﬁed by application of the rules of
the Rome I Regulation inﬂuence identiﬁcation of the applicable law under the
Rome II Regulation? The traﬃc is mostly one-way. It is diﬃcult to cite any
instance where the applicable law per Rome II inﬂuences or determines the
applicable law per Rome I; at best, in appropriate circumstances, the applicable
law under Rome II may be a factor to be weighed in the balance for an
assessment under, eg Article 4.5 of Rome I.
This is a diﬀerent subject from ascertaining the measure of horizontal
consistency and consensus between instruments. Rather, it is a question of the
37 Burke v UVEX Sports GmbH, Motorrad TAF GmbH (Record No 2003 4850P) before the
Irish High Court [2005] ILPr 26 (a Brussels Regulation case). See contra, Re a Mail Order Promise
of Win in a Draw [2003] ILPr 46 (German Federal Supreme Court), which is distinguishable from
the scenario in Burke, where there was no doubt that a contract existed.
38 It was agreed between the parties, and accepted by Herbert J, that the contract between Burke
and the second defendant was not a consumer contract within the provisions of arts 15–17 of the
Brussels I Regulation (para 31).
39 See J Hill and A Chong, International Commercial Disputes: Commercial Conﬂicts of Laws
in English Courts (4th edn, Hart 2010) para 5.6.8; and U Magnus and P Mankowski (eds),
European Commentaries on Private International Law: Brussels I Regulation (2nd rev edn, Sellier
European Law Publishers 2012) 116–19. Possibly, in practice, the approach taken may be less
‘legalistic’. See discussion in JJ Fawcett and JM Carruthers (eds), Cheshire, North & Fawcett’s
Private International Law (14th edn, OUP 2008) 251–2.
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extent to which connections exist in the formulation of the rules concerning
diﬀerent areas of law. Symbiosis between the Rome instruments is observable,
eg in Rome II, Article 4.3, in the provision conferring discretion on the forum,
in eﬀect, to override both the lex loci damni rule in Article 4.1 and the rule of
commonality in Article 4.2, in order to secure as the governing law in tort that
law which, in the view of the forum, is manifestly more closely connected with
the tort. In exercising that discretion, the forum is given a hint that such a
manifestly closer connection might be based upon a pre-existing relationship
between the parties, such as a contract that is closely connected with the tort
in question. The particularity of expression is important: the tort in question,
it seems, must derive from, or have a close association with, the contract
referred to.
Article 4.3 of the Rome II Regulation is loosely drawn, both by use of the
word ‘might’ and by the reference, at second remove, to a contract. In the
employer–employee situation (say, in an accident occurring in the workplace
where the injured employee would not have been but for his employment) or
carrier–passenger situation, the provision is likely to be apposite40—assuming
that there has not been a valid choice of law per Article 14—as may also be the
case with economic torts, such as inducement or procurement of breach of
contract. If, in the view of the forum, torts arising from the employment and
carriage situations fall within Article 4.3 of Rome II, reference will be made,
not simply to the applicable law of the contract identiﬁed per the general rules
contained in the Rome I Regulation,41 but also to the contract-speciﬁc rules
contained in Articles 5–8 thereof. This exercise would involve an incursion
into the detail of the rules of Rome I in order to arrive at a conclusion under
Rome II.
If one considers in this context the celebrated problem at common law of
a party adducing a contractual defence to a tortious claim, such as arose
in Brodin v A/R Seljan42 and Sayers v International Drilling Co NV,43 is it right
to assume that the forum, in this era of harmonized rules, still would look,
ﬁrst, to the applicable law of the tort in order to ascertain whether by that
law a contractual defence can be oﬀered,44 and thereafter ascertain, by the
law governing the contract as determined by the Rome I Regulation, if the
contract and the relevant term thereof are valid in themselves and apt to provide
a defence? To employ Article 4.3 of Rome II in order to establish at the outset
of this exercise—by reference to the pre-existing contractual relationship
between the parties—the applicable law in the tort, would cause confusing
circularity.
40 As in eg Johnson v Coventry Churchill International Ltd [1992] 3 All ER 14.
41 Arts 3 and 4. 42 1973 SC 213.
43 [1971] 1 WLR 1176. See also Coupland v Arabian Gulf Oil Co [1983] 3 All ER 326; and
Base Metal Trading Ltd v Shamurin [2005] 1 WLR 1157.
44 Reference to art 15b of the Rome II Regulation suggests such an approach.
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B. Rome I and Rome II, Ch III (Unjustiﬁed enrichment, negotiorum gestio
and culpa in contrahendo)
1. The consequences of nullity of contract and problems of unjust enrichment
By Article 12.1.e of the Rome I Regulation, the law governing a contract will
govern the consequences of nullity of a contract, including the repayment of
sums45 due under a void or nulliﬁed contract. As a result of a UK reservation46
the equivalent provision of the Rome I Convention, Art 10.1.e, did not apply in
a UK court since the consequences of nullity were regarded by UK legal
systems as pertaining to rules of restitution. In many cases the applicable law
identiﬁed by the contractual route and by the restitution route would be the
same. Now, however, since there is pan-European agreement that nullity of
contract should be dealt with by the (putative) applicable law of the necessarily
putative contract, it is time to address the possibility that the co-existence of
this rule with the choice of law rules under the Rome II Regulation, Chapter III,
may generate problems of characterization and distribution of issues between
possibly applicable laws.
The area of void and nulliﬁed contracts can cause doubt in the jurisdictional
aspect. A claim arising in restitution from a void contract does not fall under
special jurisdiction in contract, for the purpose of allocation of jurisdiction
intra-UK per Schedule 4 to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982.47
On the other hand, ‘matters relating to a contract’ can include matters relating
to a disputed contract.48 Arguably (especially from a European perspective),
the consequences of nullity of a contract should be characterized as contractual
for the purposes of jurisdiction, to chime with Article 12.1.e of the Rome I
Regulation for the purposes of choice of law. It seems not unreasonable that in
all Member State courts the remedy for such claims be regulated by the content
of what must be the putative applicable law of the void contract, and that the
court properly seised to implement this remedy be the ‘putative court’ having
special jurisdiction in contract under Article 7.1 of Regulation 1215 (ex-
Brussels Regulation, Article 5.1). To say that claims resulting from void
contracts should fall outside the ambit of Article 7.1, but those which arise out
of voidable contracts should fall within its ambit, is not a helpful dividing line,
and is likely to produce uncertainty, and also would deprive of jurisdiction to
45 Giuliano and Lagarde Report, at 33 reveals that the equivalent provision under the Rome I
Convention, art 10.1.e, was inserted to make it clear that the applicable law under the Convention
governed this issue. 46 Italy also entered a reservation under art 10.1.e.
47 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Glasgow District Council [1999] 1 AC 153. Kleinwort is not
an ECJ decision, and the ECJ may take a diﬀerent view if circumstances should present for its
ruling.
48 Boss Group SA v Boss Group France [1996] 4 All ER 970; Halki Shipping Corp v Sopex
Oils Ltd [1997] 3 All ER 833; and Belgian International Insurance Group SA v McNicoll 1999
GWD 22-1065.
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award a restitutionary payment a forum which had decided that the alleged
contract is void.49
A substantial proportion of choice of law problems arising under the head of
unjust enrichment has a foundation in a pre-existing relationship, often
contractual, between the parties. It is not surprising, therefore, that the ﬁrst limb
of the legislative solution in Article 10 of Rome II gives due weight to this
consideration. By Article 10.1, non-contractual obligations arising out of
unjust enrichment, including payment of amounts wrongly received, where
they concern a pre-existing relationship between the parties such as one
arising out of a contract or a tort (ie relational unjust enrichment) shall be
governed by the law which governs that relationship, that is to say, by the
applicable law identiﬁed according to either the Rome I (contract) or Rome II
Regulation (tort). It seems that under Article 10.1 of Rome II the applicable law
in contract will govern the obligation arising out of unjust enrichment only if
that unjust enrichment derives from, or is closely associated with, that very
contract.50 It is not clear whether the existence of a void or voidable contract
(such status being determined by application of the choice of law rules in
Rome I) would suﬃce to trigger the operation of Article 10.1.51 Borderline cases
are the conﬂict lawyer’s stock-in-trade. Turf wars, or boundary disputes, are to
be expected between Article 12.1.e of Rome I and Article 10.1 of Rome II.
2. Rome II, Article 12 (culpa in contrahendo)
Like the consequences of nullity of contract, the subject of culpa in
contrahendo weaves around the line between contractual and non-contractual
obligations. Article 1.2.i of the Rome I Regulation expressly excludes from the
scope of Rome I obligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a
contract. Article 12.1 of the Rome II Regulation applies to what it ﬁrmly
classes as a non-contractual obligation (albeit one arising out of dealings prior
to the conclusion—or not—of a contract) the applicable law of the contract,
or the putative applicable law thereof. This choice of law rule applies whether
or not a contract was actually concluded.52 If, however, the law applicable
cannot be determined under Article 12.1 of Rome II (which surely must be a
very rare case53), then the rule which must be applied under Article 12.2 is in
the same terms as the general rule for tort contained in Article 4.
49 See Hill and Chong (n 39) para 5.6.17 citing the views of Lord Nicholls (dissenting) in
Kleinwort. 50 Also art 11.1 (negotiorum gestio). cf Rome II, art 4.3.
51 The same question arises in relation to Rome II, art 4.3, but it is unlikely that a court would
place great reliance on a contract of doubtful validity, in identifying the governing law in tort; and
mutatis mutandis art 11.1. 52 Art 12.1.
53 See Cheshire, North & Fawcett (n 39) 835–6, where the case postulated is that during
negotiations each party had tried to impose without success its preferred choice of law clause on the
other, but the parties never reached consensus on the point. Or if contractual negotiations had
broken oﬀ at a very early stage, it may be impossible to ascertain the applicable law—in such
circumstances, art 12.2 must be intended to govern liability for any loss, though if negotiations
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As to the jurisdictional aspect of pre-contractual obligations (a matter left
open in Kleinwort), the House of Lords in Agnew54 was prepared to hold that
special jurisdiction in contract applied. The justiﬁcation for utilizing special
jurisdiction in contract is likely to be strongly fact-dependent. While a mis-
representation during the negotiation of a contract might justify engaging that
provision, allegations of breach of a ‘duty’ not to use undue inﬂuence or
duress, or other negative obligation, would seem to be a less persuasive case
for special jurisdiction in contract55 (but surely would not foreclose an argu-
ment for the engagement of special jurisdiction in tort, assuming that the forum
putatively seised was that of the occurrence of the actual or anticipated harm).
For example, where it was alleged that a party unjustiﬁably broke oﬀ nego-
tiations, the ECJ held in Fonderie Oﬃcine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA56 that
since no obligation had been assumed by one party to another, there was no
justiﬁcation for the application of special jurisdiction in contract. Any alleged
breach of the duty of good faith imposed by the Italian Civil Code which the
claimant sought to rely upon would have to be categorized, in jurisdictional
terms, in tort. In Fonderie, no contract resulted, and Agnew is distinguishable
on that ground.
C. Reliance between Instruments
Agreements on choice of court and/or on choice of law are themselves
contracts.
1. Brussels/Rome I
By dint of Article 1.2.e of the Rome I Regulation (like its predecessor,
Article 1.2.d of the Rome Convention), agreements on choice of court and
arbitration agreements are excluded from the scope of the Rome I Regulation
and their validity will be judged in a Member State court by that court’s
national rules. Thus, in a UK forum, a choice of court agreement will be judged
as to formal and essential validity by common law rules.57 But within the
Brussels scheme of jurisdiction and judgments, in the matter of prorogation,
Article 25 of Regulation 1215 (ex-Brussels I Regulation, Article 23) makes
were at a very early stage one would imagine that reparable loss such as to give rise to litigation
engaging art 12.2 would be infrequently encountered.
54 Agnew v Lansforsakringsbolagens AB [2001] 1 AC 223 (a Lugano case).
55 Cheshire, North & Fawcett (n 39) 231–2.
56 Fonderie Oﬃcine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v Heinrich Wagner Sinto Machinenfabrik
GmbH Case C-334/00 [2002] ECR 1-7377.
57 See EB Crawford, International Private Law in Scotland (W Green & Son 1998) paras
12.21–12.31; and PM North and JJ Fawcett, Cheshire and North’s Private International Law
(11th edn, Butterworths 1987) ch 18.
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special provision as to form.58 No doubt residual, important questions might
arise as to essential validity or interpretation, requiring recourse to national
choice of law rules in contract, but for many matters (encompassing not only
form, but also the presumption of exclusivity), Article 25 will provide. This
is an example of the sharing between harmonized instruments and national
rules, of the treatment of diﬀerent aspects of one topic, ie permission to choose
a court, and the constitution of the contract by which that court is chosen: a
modern manifestation of dépeçage.
Article 25 of Regulation 1215 makes no provision regarding the material
validity of prorogation agreements. UK jurisprudence suggests that only in a
very extreme case can the appearance of consensus be challenged,59 but if such
a case were to arise, consent is to be tested, presumably, by reference to pre-
existing national choice of law rules.60
2. Rome II, Article 14 and Rome I
There can be direct choice of law, per Rome II, Article 14, and choice of
applicable law at second remove, through operation of Rome II, Article 10.1.
Where the agreement on choice of law is authorized by Article 14, reference
must be had to the Rome I Regulation when assessing formal validity, inter-
pretation, material validity (at least so far as demonstrating consensus), and
breach. To the issue of contractual capacity in Article 13 of the Rome I
Regulation, however, must be added the antecedent proviso supplied by
Rome II, Article 14, that only ‘parties pursuing a commercial activity’ can
make such an agreement before the event giving rise to the damage occurs.61
As to essential validity of the terms of the choice of law agreement, the
position is less clear. For example, A and B, commercial parties, agree in
advance of any potential tortious incident that liability will be governed by the
law of Evasia, by which, let it be assumed, there is no principle of vicarious
liability of an employer for an employee. The employment contract in which
58 Presumably governing also the formal requirements of choice of court clauses adverted to in
arts 15, 19 and 23 of Regulation 1215, though such choices made by disadvantaged parties are
restricted as to content in their own perceived best interests. There is interdependence, therefore, in
that while art 25 appears to be the source of the rules governing the making of a valid jurisdiction
agreement, no agreement can be made under the aegis of art 25 which contravenes arts 15, 19
and 23.
59 Deutsche Bank AG v Asia Paciﬁc Broadband Wireless Communications Inc [2008]2 Lloyd’s
Rep 619. Considered by Vitol SA v Arcturus Merchant Trust Ltd [2009] EWHC 800 (Comm); and
followed by UBS AG v HSH Nordbank AG [2009] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 272. The Court of Appeal
distinguished the situation from the type of case demonstrated by Bols Distilleries BV t/a Bols
Royal Distilleries v Superior Yacht Services Ltd [2007] 1 WLR 12 where it could be seen that
although a jurisdiction clause existed, no substantive ﬁnal agreement on the contract itself had been
reached between the parties.
60 Represented in the UK by Albeko Schuhmaschinen AG v Kamborian Shoe Machine Co
(1961) 111 LJ 519.
61 Noting again also the prohibitions upon freedom of choice contained in Rome II, arts 6
and 8.
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A and B make this ‘Rome II, Article 14 agreement’, contains a clause to the
eﬀect that the law governing the contract as a whole shall be Scots law (per
Rome I Regulation, Article 3). Insofar as employer vicarious liability is a
principle of Scots law which cannot be derogated from by agreement, the ques-
tion arises whether the essential validity of the tortious choice of law agree-
ment must be judged by the applicable law of the main contract (Scots law)
or by the applicable law, contractually agreed by the parties, to govern the
non-contractual obligation (Evasian law). Rome II appears to anticipate this
problem through its mandatory rules provision in Article 14.2,62 but this will
not cover all cases. In a situation in relation to which more than two laws have
an interest in being applied, it is arguable that the policing mechanisms oper-
ative under the Rome I Regulation, namely, Articles 8 (employment contracts),
9 (overriding mandatory provisions), and 21 (public policy of the forum) will
apply so as to temper the choice of law agreement made under Article 14 of
Rome II.63 Viewed from this perspective, the extent of party autonomy in the
non-contractual sphere is restricted by the rules governing party autonomy in
contractual obligations.
This conclusion suggests that the non-contractual obligation is subjugated to
the larger contractual choice of law provision. By this mode of reasoning, any
attempt by parties to evade a principle such as employer vicarious liability for
the wrongful actings of employees would be diﬃcult to achieve.64
3. Interrelationship between choice of court and choice of law(s): Regulation
1215, Article 25 and Rome I
A draft formulation of the Rome I Regulation,65 within the then Article 3.1,
proposed that there be a presumption that if parties had agreed to confer
jurisdiction on a court of a Member State to hear disputes arising out of the
contract, they should be presumed also to have chosen the law of that Member
State to govern the contract. There was no indication of the factors which
might serve to rebut this presumption, nor any concession that the existence of
such a presumption would diminish the importance, and curtail the scope of
operation, of Article 4, which in the same draft contained eight bespoke rules to
identify the applicable law for diﬀerent types of contract in the absence of
choice of law by the parties. In eﬀect, choice of court was prioritized, being
elevated and equated to an implied or imputed choice of law.
Although the ‘choice of court imputing choice of law’ presumption was
excised during negotiations, it cannot be said that all trace of it has disappeared
from the Regulation, for there is to be found in recital (12) the provision that,
62 So too per art 14.3, mandatory rules of Community law.
63 See further, Section IV below. 64 cf Brodin v A R Seljan 1973 SC 213.
65 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I) (COM (2005) 650 ﬁnal; 2005/0261 (COD))
art 3.1.
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‘An agreement between the parties to confer on one or more courts or tribunals
of a Member State exclusive jurisdiction to determine disputes under the
contract should be one of the factors to be taken into account in determining
whether a choice of law has been clearly demonstrated’. Possibly the mind of a
judge applying Article 4 may be inﬂuenced by the terms of the recital, and
knowledge of its genesis.
The link between choice of court and choice of law was not unknown at
common law in the UK.66 It does not seem unreasonable in an otherwise
evenly-balanced case that the parties’ exclusive choice of court should weigh
in the balance to support a ﬁnding that the law of the forum is the applicable
law of the contract. From a pragmatic perspective, a contract containing a
choice of court clause is likely to contain a choice of law clause. Conceivably,
parties might wish to choose a law diﬀerent from the law of their selected
court,67 but it does not seem too much to require that the onus should be upon
them to bring this about by express provision.
IV. DISADVANTAGED PARTIES
In the light of these musings on continuity, consistency and consensus, it is a
worthwhile exercise to consider how the Regulations, in combination, treat
so-called disadvantaged parties.
A. The Brussels/Rome I Axis
On the Brussels/Rome I axis, there has been steady and purposeful progress
towards the creation of a set of rules to protect those persons who are perceived
to be of unequal bargaining power in their dealings as private individuals with
commercial or professional parties. These rules comprise specialized pro-
visions of jurisdiction and choice of law tantamount to a quasi-code to assist
such persons.68
The process of catch-up, instrument with instrument, in this subject area can
clearly be traced. The time line from 1968 shows that protective jurisdictional
provisions were made in the Brussels Convention in favour of consumers,
insured parties and, to a lesser extent, employees.69 The Rome Convention
provided advantageous applicable law rules for consumers and employees.70
The Brussels Regulation enhanced employee protection in jurisdiction by
66 See discussion at EB Crawford and JM Carruthers, International Private Law: A Scots
Perspective (3rd edn, W Green & Son 2010) para 15–12.
67 cf the default position eﬀected by combination of art 5.1.b, Brussels I Regulation, and art 4.1.
a of Rome I Regulation: see above, Section II.C.
68 Regulation 1215, Chapter II, Sections 3, 4 and 5 and Rome I Regulation, arts 6, 7 and 8. As
to the protection aﬀorded by the Rome II Regulation, see Section IV.B, below.
69 Arts 8–15. Contracts of employment were provided for in the 1968 Brussels Convention
under art 5.1. 70 Arts 5 and 6.
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giving employees71 treatment equivalent to consumers and insured parties,
and welcoming them fully to the favoured ranks of the disadvantaged. The
Rome I Regulation has a bespoke provision governing insurance contracts.72
Regulation 1215 will improve the situation of consumers and employees,
respectively, as above noted,73 in bestowing on them the further beneﬁt of
suing a non-EU domiciled commercial party or a non-EU domiciled employer
in the weaker party’s EU Member State of domicile or place of work.
Unevenness remains, however, in that this advantage has not been extended to
insured parties. On the other hand, the lack of parity among the disadvantaged
which exists under the Brussels I Regulation per Article 35.174 has been
remedied by Regulation 1215, Article 45.1(e). The rationale for the Brussels I
Regulation exclusion of employee protection in this matter of judgment
enforcement appeared to be that the employee is more likely to be the claimant
in the court of origin, and so it would be to his detriment, or at least potentially
so, to frame the rules in such a way that the jurisdiction of the court of origin
might be open to challenge in the court addressed.75 Be that as it may,
Regulation 1215, by Article 45.1(e) has placed employees on an equal footing
with those in the other ‘weaker party’ categories. Evidently, therefore, there is
broad equivalence in conﬂict of laws treatment of ‘weaker parties’, and a clear
policy objective across all the instruments to protect them.
A secondary question is whether, on closer analysis, the same people qualify
to beneﬁt from the favourable jurisdiction rules as from the favourable choice
of law rules. In terms of horizontal harmony, it is reasonable to ask whether, for
example, a consumer as envisaged by Regulation 1215 has a doppelgänger in
the choice of law provisions in the Rome I Regulation.76 Searching for guid-
ance in interpretation, greater assistance is to be derived from the jurisprudence
concerning jurisdiction,77 where there are many more cases, from high and low
in the judicial hierarchy, on the deﬁnition of consumer78 than there are for
choice of law. The Giuliano and Lagarde Report states that the deﬁnition of
consumer contracts in the Rome I Convention corresponds to that contained in
71 Arts 18–21. Protective provisions for employees, under Brussels and Rome, are restricted to
‘individual’ contracts of employment, as distinguished from collective agreements.
72 Art 7. 73 Section II.A.1, above.
74 And art 35.3. 75 Hill and Chong (n 39) para.13.3.5.
76 Albeit that the ediﬁce of protection does not rest simply on the individual being a
‘consumer’, though being a consumer is a condition precedent.
77 cf Gruber v BayWa AG Case C-464/01 [2006] QB 204.
78 See eg Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl Case C-269/95 [1998] All ER (EC) 135, Hans-Hermann
Mietz v Intership Yachting Sneek BV (Case C-99/96) [1999] ILPr 541; Standard Bank of London v
Apostolakis (Protodikeio Athens) [2003] ILPr29; and Engler v Janus Versand GmbH Case 27/02
[2005] 7 CL 76 (ECJ). Contrast Chris Hart (Business Sales) Ltd v Niven 1992 SLT (Sh. Ct) 53;
B. J. Mann (Advertising) Ltd v Ace Welding & Fabrications Ltd 1994 SCLR 763; Standard Bank
London Ltd v Apostolakis (No 1) [2000] ILPr 766; Rayner v Davies [2003] ILPr 15; Semple Fraser
v Quayle 2002 SLT (Sh Ct) 33; Prostar Management Ltd v Twaddle 2003 SLT (Sh Ct) 11; and
Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Henkel Case C 167-1000 [2003] All ER (EC) 311 (ECJ).
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Article 13 of the Brussels Convention.79 If a person acts partly within and
partly outside his trade or profession, he will be regarded as a consumer only if,
in the instance in question, he acts primarily outside his trade or profession.80
An illustration of the degree of consistency sought to be achieved between
subsequent instruments, whether in the same family line or not, in the treatment
of consumers, is provided by recital (24) of the Rome I Regulation,81 to the
eﬀect that that instrument and the Brussels Regulation should take the same
approach to the signiﬁcance of dealings by way of the internet. As regards
online consumer transacting, the Rome I Regulation caught up with the
Brussels I Regulation in adopting the verb ‘directed to’—a phrase repeated in
Regulation 1215, Article 17.1(c)—and it is clear that there is a harmony of aim
and interpretation between the instruments.82 All roads seem to lead us to a
common junction of consensus.
In terms of internal coherence within a single instrument, there is a separate
question whether, for example, an insured person can ‘double-up’ as a
consumer, and if so, which set of protective rules within an instrument, be it
Regulation 1215 or the Rome I Regulation, should take precedence? It may be
in any given case that though in principle an ‘active’ seeker of insurance cover
also can be regarded as a consumer, the consumer protective conﬂict of laws
provisions may be beyond his reach by reason of some specialty in the facts,
such as the ‘consumer’ acting primarily in a business capacity.83 If so, the
question of precedence of provisions in the instant case is answered. If not,
although it has been asserted84 that Section 3 (insurance) takes precedence over
Section 4 (consumer contracts), a purposive interpretation of the instruments
would lead to the conclusion that not only should weaker parties be protected
by conﬂict of law rules that are more favourable to their interests than the
general rules,85 but that, by extension, they should have the better of the
protective options available.
79 Giuliano and Lagarde Report, OJ C282, 31.10.80, at 24.
80 Cheshire, North & Fawcett (n 39) 726. An intended coincidence of forum and law is visible
also in relation to individual contracts of employment: see Jenard Report OJ C59 5.3.79, at 24.
81 ‘With more speciﬁc reference to consumer contracts, . . . Consistency with Regulation (EC)
No 44/2001 requires both that there be a reference to the concept of directed activity as a condition
for applying the consumer protection rule and that the concept be interpreted harmoniously in
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 and this Regulation . . . ’.
82 Schlosser Report, OJ C59, 5.3.79, at 119; and Giuliano and Lagarde Report, OJ C282,
31.10.80, at 24.
83 Gruber v BayWa AG Case C-464/01 [2006] QB 204. Protection under Section 3 extends to
policyholders who take out insurance contracts as part of their trade or profession: New Hampshire
Insurance Co v Strabag Bau AG [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 361. See Magnus and Mankowski (n 39)
333; and Lord Collins et al (eds), Dicey, Morris & Collins: The Conﬂict of Laws (15th edn, Sweet
& Maxwell 2012) para 11-339, making the point in connection with New Hampshire that ‘matters
relating to insurance’ is not restricted to insurance for domestic or private purposes.
84 Schlosser Report, OJ C59, 5.3.79, at 119; and Magnus and Mankowski (n 39) 365 (without,
however, reference to authority).
85 Regulation 1215, recital (18) and Rome I Regulation, recital (23).
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In the matter of insurance contracts, the persons who are to beneﬁt from
Articles 10–16 of Regulation 1215 (ex-Articles 8–14 of the Brussels I
Regulation) comprise the policyholder, the insured or a beneﬁciary. In the
case of Odenbreit,86 the ECJ, in a signiﬁcant decision eﬀectively enlarged
the class of persons who may derive advantage from Chapter II, Section 3 of
the Brussels Regulation, by holding that the victim of a road accident occurring
in the Netherlands, might sue in Germany (his own domicile) the insurance
company (established in the Netherlands) of the person responsible for the
accident. This, therefore, brings the claimant/victim into the front rank for
protection alongside those categories of persons explicitly named in Article 9,
who, as a class, enjoy the beneﬁt of forum actoris rules. The ECJ, in taking
a teleological approach, relied upon the purpose of Chapter II, Section 387 of
the Regulation, which, as noted, guarantees more favourable protection to
the weaker party than is conferred by the general rules of jurisdiction.88 To
deny the injured party the right to litigate in his own domicile would be
contrary to the spirit of the Regulation. In German private international law, the
right of action of an injured party was regarded as a right in tort, and not as a
right under an insurance contract. The ECJ held that the tortious nature in
German law of the action by the injured party, as a matter extrinsic to the
contractual relations between the insured wrongdoer and his insurer, did not
preclude opening to the injured party the benevolent jurisdiction provisions of
Article 9. The overriding spirit of the Regulation seems to have resulted in
fudging subtleties of characterization. Notably, however, in Vorarlberger
Gebietskrankenkasse,89 the ECJ decided that a further extension of forum
actoris beneﬁt should not be granted to a social security institution acting as a
statutory assignee of the rights of the victim of a road traﬃc accident, since the
institution was not to be regarded as an economically weaker party, and the
contending parties were to be regarded as equals. It was made clear by the ECJ
in the Group Josi litigation90 that although special rules on jurisdiction apply
to certain insurance contracts, those rules have no application to reinsurance
contracts, for protection of the insured party is not justiﬁed in the context of the
equal relationship between the reinsurer and the reinsured.
Clearly, both in choice of law rules, and in jurisdiction rules with regard to
insurance, the draftsmen have been concerned to draw distinctions between
diﬀerent, widely varying types of insurance contract, so as to ensure that
preferential treatment is given only where preference is due; and also with the
aim of avoiding undue disturbance to the large-scale insurance sector. Within
the class of insured persons, provided for in the Rome I Regulation, Article 7,
86 FBTO Schadeverzekeringen NV v Odenbreit (Case C-463/06) before the Court of Justice of
the European Communities (Second Chamber) 13 December 2007 [2008] ILPr 12.
87 cf Chapter II, Sections 4 and 5. 88 See recital (13), Brussels I Regulation.
89 Vorarlberger Gebietskrankenkasse v WGV-Schwabische Allgemeine Versicherungs AG
Case C-347/08 OJ 2008 C272/11, [2010] ILPr 2.
90 Universal General Insurance Co v Group Josi Reinsurance Co SA [2001] QB 68.
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there is a diﬀerence in treatment between insurance contracts covering large
risks as deﬁned91 (whether or not the risk covered is situated in a Member
State) and all other insurance risks situated inside the territory of the Member
States. Similarly, in provisions concerning insurance,92 a distinction is
made between those specialized or large-scale risks itemized in Article 16
of Regulation 121593 and those more general or smaller risks represented
typically by life assurance, motor insurance, and liability insurance contracts.
With regard to Regulation 1215, one may query the relationship between
Chapter II, Section 7 (particularly Article 26) and Sections 3, 4 and 5. There
was no overt indication in the Brussels Regulation that Section 7 (prorogation
of jurisdiction) was outranked by the Sections containing protective provisions
for disadvantaged persons,94 nor any authoritative ECJ interpretation thereon,
such as is provided by the ruling in Erich Gasser GmbH v Misat Srl95 on the
relationship between Articles 17 and 21 of the Brussels Convention.96 It was
assumed that the principle of submission without protest as found in Article 24
of the Brussels Regulation applied with full force to disadvantaged parties,97
the rationale of Article 24 being that, since it represents a later choice by a
party, it supersedes any choice of court made earlier; and if Article 24 aﬀects
disadvantaged parties in like manner, this must mean that no account was to be
taken, upon the later eventuality of submission to a jurisdiction, of lack of full
freedom to choose in the ﬁrst instance.98 No special treatment was to be
aﬀorded on the second occasion: to have provided otherwise would have
been seen as beneﬁting the disadvantaged twice—a beneﬁt too far, there being
no intention, seemingly, to strengthen such parties’ pre-existing protection.
The Brussels Regulation approach was that, after the dispute had arisen,99
weaker parties were not to be treated as being in need of special protection,
and therefore it was right to regard them as fully capax and so they
would ‘completely regain their freedom’100 in the matter of choice of
91 See First Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973, art 5.d.
92 Arts 10–16.
93 As, for example, all ‘large’ risks as deﬁned in Directive 2009/138/ of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009.
94 Contrast the speciﬁc exception of art 22 from the application of art 24.
95 C-116/02 [2003] ECR 1-4207.
96 cf arts 23 and 27 of the Brussels Regulation; and, by way of corrective, art 31.2 of
Regulation 1215.
97 See Hill and Chong (n 39) paras 5.8.3 and 5.8.24; and Cheshire, North & Fawcett (n 39)
268, 272 and 275. More ambivalently, see Magnus and Mankowski (n 39) 390–1; the text at pages
522–3 concludes that the submission principle applies with equal force to the disadvantaged, but
looks forward to a more lenient approach in Regulation 1215 (with reference to Judgment of the
Court (Fourth Chamber) of 20 May 2010 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Okresní soud
v Chebu Czech Republic) Cˇeská podnikatelská pojišt’ovna as, Vienna Insurance Group v Michal
Bilas (Case C-111/09)).
98 Though under Brussels Regulation weaker parties were required to follow art 23, the content
of their choice was circumscribed for their own beneﬁt by arts 14, 17 and 21.
99 Arts 13.1, 17.1 and 21.1. 100 Jenard Report, OJ C59, 5.3.79, at 34.
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jurisdiction,101 whether that choice be made expressly (Articles 13.1, 17.1 or
21.1), or tacitly through submission (per Article 24). Should they have found
themselves in a court other than their own, they and their advisers were
equipped by these special rules102 to make an eﬀective challenge, provided that
the litigant could prove his membership of the ranks of the disadvantaged, and
that the facts otherwise justiﬁed application of the protective provisions.103
There has been a slight softening of attitude in that Article 26.2 of Regulation
1215 seeks to protect such parties from ill-judged submission under Article
26.1, by providing that the court, before assuming jurisdiction on the basis of
submission, is required to ensure that such a defendant is informed of his right
to contest the jurisdiction of the court, and of the consequences of entering or
not entering an appearance.
B. The Rome I/Rome II Axis (Rome II, Ch II: Torts/Delicts)
In the Rome II Regulation, there is less ex facie protection of ‘disadvantaged’
or ‘weaker’ parties; one must search carefully for any indication of special
treatment, or of even vestigial advantage. Looking at Rome II through the lens
of a consumer, it can be seen that the terms of Article 5 (product liability) are
driven partly by the objective of protecting consumers. This is expressly
supported by the terms of recital (20).104 In Article 6.1 (unfair competition and
acts restricting free competition), there is overt protection of consumers’
interests.105 With regard to employment protection, reference may be made to
Rome II, Article 9 (industrial action): although an aim of the Rome I
Regulation and the Brussels instruments is to confer employee protection, the
employee normally being regarded as the party at the disadvantage, Article 9 of
Rome II, by contrast, confers a degree of protection, not only on workers, but
also on employers.106
On the theme of the interrelationship of articles within one instrument,
Rome II, in Article 7 (environmental damage), aﬀords a choice to an aggrieved
party, namely, that while normally the applicable law shall be that set down by
Article 4.1 (the law of the country in which the damage occurs), the person
seeking compensation (the victim) may choose to base his claim on the law of
101 But not as to choice of law, for Rome I Regulation, art 6 still will apply, conferring special
protection (by way of restriction). 102 ie as provided for by arts 12, 16.2, and 20.
103 See Crawford and Carruthers (n 66) para 7-53.
104 ‘The conﬂict-of-law rule in matters of product liability should meet the objectives of fairly
spreading the risks inherent in a modern high-technology society, protecting consumers’ health,
stimulating innovation, securing undistorted competition and facilitating trade’. (Emphasis added.)
105 ‘The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of an act of unfair
competition shall be the law of the country where competitive relations or the collective interests of
consumers are, or are likely to be, aﬀected’. cf recital (21): ‘The special rule in Article 6 is not an
exception to the general rule in Article 4(1) but rather a clariﬁcation of it. In matters of unfair
competition, the conﬂict-of-law rule should protect competitors, consumers and the general public
and ensure that the market economy functions properly’. (Emphasis added.)
106 Recital (27).
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the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred.107 This is a
form of positive discrimination in favour of the victim.108 There is a related
question, not yet answered, concerning the internal coherence of Rome II, as to
whether the benevolent Article 7 outranks Article 5 (product liability) in a
situation where an allegedly defective product causes environmental damage.
Arguably, in all situations where doubt arises about the ranking of choice of
law rules, the victim should be able to invoke that provision which is more
favourable to him.
1. Choice of law implications of the jurisdiction hierarchy
Although tactical advantage may result from the application of diﬀerent
choice of law rules governing, respectively, consumer actions in contract
and in tort, speculation as to advantageous choice of law provision is brought
down to earth by the rules of jurisdiction of the regime, in particular the
supremacy of the rule of special jurisdiction in contract over that in tort, which
precludes suit under the head of tort if there exists a contractual link between
the parties.109 There are therefore conﬂict of laws constraints upon party
freedom to choose to sue in contract and tort in the alternative, in contrast
with the situation which obtains under the domestic laws of some Member
States. It is arguable, therefore, that the prescient adviser, in the product
liability/consumer contract case, anxious not to exclude any advantage for his
client, should recommend suing under Article 4 of Regulation 1215 (general
jurisdiction; ex-Brussels Regulation, Article 2), to permit presentation of
claims in the alternative.
But what is the position in terms of choice of law pleading once jurisdiction
is established on any ground? If Article 4 jurisdiction is used, presumably the
beneﬁt to the claimant is that he may sue in contract or tort under Rome I or
Rome II in the alternative, to hedge his risk or better his chances.110 Moreover
Article 4 is available where the circumstances cannot be said to fall into any
of the special categories (in particular neither within contract nor tort)111. But if
Article 7.1 or 7.3 of Regulation 1215 be used (special jurisdiction; ex-Brussels
Regulation, Article 5.1 or 5.3), then the claimant’s case would appear to be
limited to an argument in contract or tort, respectively. It would seem as
107 In sympathy with the jurisdictional principle of ubiquity contained in Bier BV v Mines de
Potasse D’Alsace SA (21/76) [1978] QB 708.
108 Recital (25): ‘Regarding environmental damage, . . . the principle that the polluter pays, fully
justiﬁes the use of the principle of discriminating in favour of the person sustaining the damage’.
(Emphasis added.)
109 Kalfelis v Schroder [1988] ECR 5565; [1989] ECC 407 (a Brussels Convention case). See
also Source Ltd v TUV Rheinland Holding AG [1998] QB 54. See Section II.D, above.
110 See Hill and Chong (n 39) para 5.6.8.
111 See Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Glasgow City Council [1999] 1 AC 153. But see above,
Section III.B.1, re consideration of jurisdiction in cases of nullity of contract.
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impossible under the Brussels regime, as in any steeplechase, to change horses
once through the gate.112
There is a question whether or not this apparently felicitous equine metaphor
is indeed well chosen; not only might the legal situation before a national court
be, in practice, a little more ﬂexible than indicated, but also it is possible that in
strict law the point still may be open. Riding two horses at the same time is a
feat which may be achievable in the jurisdictional context, for example, where
the two claims in contract and tort, though arising essentially out of the same
set of circumstances, are entirely separate, the claim in contract being founded
simply on an argument that payment was due, and the claim in tort resting on
an alleged misstatement by an employee of the defendant as to the correct
manner of payment.113 That a court properly seised under Article 24 (exclusive
jurisdiction; ex-Brussels Regulation, Article 22) may deal incidentally with
‘non-exclusive’ issues; and that a ‘non-exclusive forum’ may deal incidentally
with an ‘exclusive’ issue is an interesting, but distinguishable point from that
under scrutiny—for in the Article 24 scenario, the issues being advanced are
principal and auxiliary, rather than ‘alternative’ claims. By way of contrast, the
ECJ in Kalfelis made clear that since the bases of special jurisdiction constitute
derogations from the principle that the courts of the State where the defendant
is domiciled have jurisdiction, and these derogations must be interpreted
strictly, it must be accepted that a court with special jurisdiction in tort dealing
with the part of a claim which is based on tort, does not have jurisdiction
to deal with the other parts of the same claim which are not so based.114
Generally, however, what must ﬁrst be decided is whether, in terms of juris-
diction under Regulation 1215, the claim pertains to contract or to tort: ‘juris-
diction is not allocated according to the remedy sought’.115 Since the contract
and tort bases of special jurisdiction are mutually exclusive,116 it follows that,
if the claim is founded upon a contractual agreement, the fact that under the
national law of the forum a claim might lie also in tort is irrelevant.117 This
canter round the course tends to conﬁrm the assertion that, in a single race, one
may not change horses.
It is necessary to examine the Rome I/Rome II borderland in the situation
where a consumer is injured by the defective product which was the subject of
112 Base Metal Trading Ltd v Shamurin [2005] 1 WLR 1157, being concerned with choice of
law, is not on all fours with the point under discussion.
113 Example cited in Cheshire, North & Fawcett (n 39) 252, discussing Domicrest v Swiss Bank
Corporation [1999] QB 548, per Rix J at 561.
114 Kalfelis v Schroder [1988] ECR 5565; [1989] ECC 407, para 19.
115 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Glasgow City Council [1996] QB 678 (Court of Appeal—reversed
by House of Lords on another point), per Millett LJ, at 698, cited with approval in Source Ltd v
TUV Rheinland Holding AG [1998] QB 54, per Staughton LJ at 63.
116 Discussed above, Section II.D. See discussion in Cheshire, North & Fawcett’s Private
International Law (n 39) 251–2.
117 But see L Merrett, Employment Contracts in Private International Law (OUP 2011) at
para 4.49, pertaining to a distinction which may be legitimate to make in connection with the
specialties of employment cases.
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his consumer contract. A diﬀerent outcome might be produced by application
of the Rome I Regulation, Article 6 (consumer contracts), than by application
of the Rome II Regulation, Article 5 (product liability). Admittedly, the ﬁrst
localizing agent under both provisions is the law of the habitual residence of
the consumer, but, especially under Rome II, there are other possibilities,
which not implausibly the forum might follow, such as the law of the country
of acquisition of the product,118 or the law of the country in which the damage
occurred,119 and account also would require to be taken of a general discretion
available to the forum under Article 5 of Rome II.120 Additionally, party choice
of law appears to be unfettered in relation to product liability under Rome II
(whether direct choice within the terms of Article 14,121 or at second remove
by virtue of choice of applicable law in related contractual matters, per
Article 5.2), whereas choice of law, though permitted in principle with regard
to consumers under Article 6.3 of the Rome I Regulation, cannot deprive a
consumer of the protection aﬀorded to him by those rules of the otherwise
applicable law (of his habitual residence) which cannot be derogated from by
contract. It is impossible to say in the abstract which instrument would prove
more beneﬁcial to a consumer, but the Rome I Regulation appears to provide
greater certainty as to governing law than does the Rome II Regulation.
C. Restrictions on Party Autonomy: The Temporal Dimension
Since Regulation 1215, like the Brussels Regulation, is infused in Chapter II,
Sections 3, 4 and 5 with examples of protective concern to prevent the naïve
and unwary from making a choice of court to their detriment, and since the
Rome I Regulation equally is characterized by the same concern with regard to
choosing an applicable law unfavourable to a person of inferior bargaining
power, it is perhaps surprising that the Rome II Regulation, by allowing
expressly freedom of choice of governing law per Article 14, makes only
limited attempts to safeguard weaker parties. Such mandatory protections as
are contained in Rome II (in the form of prohibitions against contracting out of
the applicable law rules provided by the Regulation) are to be found in Article
6.4, to the eﬀect of forbidding contracting out of the applicable law rule
contained in Article 6 (unfair competition and acts restricting free compe-
tition), and in Article 8.3 (infringement of intellectual property rights), by
means of choice under Article 14.122
The principal protection is founded upon the factor of time, that is, whether
the choice of law may be made before or only after the event giving rise to the
118 Rome II, art 5.1.b. 119 Rome II, art 5.1.c.
120 Rome II, art 5.2. Rome I Regulation, art 6 aﬀords the forum no such discretion.
121 Contrast Rome II, arts 6.4 (unfair competition) and 8.3 (infringement of intellectual property
rights).
122 Arts 6.4 and 8.3 both provide that: ‘The law applicable under this Article may not be
derogated from by an agreement pursuant to Article 14.’
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damage occurred. Parties who are pursuing a commercial activity are auth-
orized in terms of Article 14.1.b to make a choice of law by an agreement
freely negotiated before the event giving rise to the damage. Other parties may
agree to submit the issue to the law of their choice only by an agreement
entered into after the event.123 During the Rome II negotiations, the principle
of party autonomy and the temporal dimension were matters of active
debate.124 The resulting provision is a compromise among strongly held diﬀer-
ing Member State views. For the UK, express authorization of such autonomy
is a novelty.125
Choice ex ante is not available to non-commercial parties. Yet choice ex post
is not necessarily informed choice, permission to choose the applicable law
only after the event being no guarantee that advantage will not be taken of the
weaker or less well-informed party. Nevertheless, the theory behind the
limitation of parties to choice ex post seems to be that they will thereby be
protected from inadvertently waiving their rights, or yielding to the will of the
other party in advance of the dispute. Similarly, in Regulation 1215, parties
deemed to be weak (where there is inequality, real or supposed, in bargaining
power) are restricted in their exercise of free will to the making of choices after
the event or within certain safeguards.126 There being no speciﬁc guidance in
Article 14 or in recital (31) of Rome II on the deﬁnition of ‘pursuing a
commercial activity’, it is not entirely clear whether an employee could be
regarded as pursuing a commercial activity. Only if that were the case, could
the employer and employee in the employment contract make a choice of law
in tort ex ante;127 in that situation, a degree of protection could be aﬀorded to
the employee by the terms of Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation. If, however,
the employer/employee agreement as to choice of law in (future) torts was a
discrete agreement, separate from the main employment contract, the Article 8
protection would slip. Ex facie, there is no requirement in Article 14 of Rome II
that commercial activities are being undertaken by parties of equal bargaining
power.
123 See also recital (31): ‘To respect the principle of party autonomy and to enhance legal
certainty, the parties should be allowed to make a choice as to the law applicable to a non-
contractual obligation. This choice should be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty
by the circumstances of the case. Where establishing the existence of the agreement, the court has
to respect the intentions of the parties. Protection should be given to weaker parties by imposing
certain conditions on the choice.’
124 See A Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation: The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual
Obligations (OUP 2008) 540; and JM Carruthers and EB Crawford, ‘Variations on a Theme of
Rome II: Reﬂections on Proposed Choice of Law Rules for Non-Contractual Obligations, Part I’
(2005) 9 EdinLR 65, 87–8.
125 PM North, Essays in Private International Law (OUP 1993) 85–6.
126 Regulation 1215, arts 15, 19 and 23 (ex-Brussels I Regulation, arts 13, 17 and 21).
127 cf example postulated above at Section III.C.2.
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V. CONCLUSION
What emerges from this examination is that there exists a strong degree of
connection and interdependence between and among the main jurisdiction and
applicable law instruments in the private international law of obligations. The
conclusion that these instruments are operating, or will operate, in a reﬁned and
mutually cooperative manner does not mean, however, that the Regulations are
entirely self-contained (for private international law instruments are subject,
for example, to Community law)128 or self-suﬃcient.129
Outside the private international law of obligations, a complication
which must be reﬂected upon is the comprehensiveness or otherwise of the
European harmonization programme within Europe as a result, ﬁrst, of the
UK/Irish discretion to opt-in,130 and secondly, of the possibility of non-
participation by certain Member States in certain (family law) instruments.131
Additionally, certain of the newer instruments, by virtue of the exclusions
from their respective scopes, seem to be ripe for the production of demarcation
problems.132 This problem, though visible in relation to nullity of contract,
is more pressing in family law and property matters, and seems increasingly
to be a feature of the advancing harmonization programme.
The territorial scope of EU instruments on jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments, notoriously, is not beyond argument, as
evidenced by decisions in Owusu133 and Orams,134 and development of
128 Rome I Regulation, art 23; and Rome II Regulation, art 27. Further, with regard to road
traﬃc accidents taking place within the EU, for example, account must be taken of Directive 2009/
103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance
against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation
to insure against such liability (OJ 2009 L263/11). See also the Proposal for a Regulation on a
Common European Sales Law (CESL) (COM (2011) 635 ﬁnal; 2011/0284 (COD)).
129 For example, in disputes concerning individual contracts of employment, questions may
arise as to the intended territorial scope of a domestic statute of the lex causae. See further Merrett
(n 117) para 1.12–1.16; and Crawford and Carruthers (n 66) para 3.07.
130 Protocol No 21 on the position of the UK and Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice (OJ 2008 C115/295) (ex-Protocol No 4 (OJ 1997 C340/99)).
131 eg enhanced cooperation per Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/201 of 20 December 2010
implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal
separation (‘Rome III’).
132 As among eg Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and
acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation
of a European Certiﬁcate of Succession; the Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction,
applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property
regimes COM (2011) 126 ﬁnal; 2011/0059 (CNS); and the parallel Proposal for a Council
Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions
regarding the property consequences of registered partnerships COM (2011) 127 ﬁnal; 2011/0060
(CNS).
133 Owusu v Jackson (t/a Villa Holidays Bal Inn Villas) (C-281/02) [2005] QB 801. See also
Samengo-Turner v J&H Marsh & McLennan Services Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 723.
134 Orams v Apostolides [2007] 1 WLR. 241, reversed by Apostolides v Orams Case C-420/07,
Times, 1 May 2009.
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‘reﬂexive eﬀect’ reasoning.135 Regulation 1215 has drawn back from full-scale
engagement, for the time being,136 with the subject of the impact of the
European regime on Third States, but there is no doubt that this will be a topic
of considerable ongoing importance. In choice of law, there is a related
problem, namely, the interaction of the European regime with ‘non-EU’
instruments, principally Hague Conference conventions, and notably in the
context of the law of obligations, the 1971 Hague Convention on the Law
Applicable to Traﬃc Accidents, the 1973 Hague Convention on the Law
Applicable to Products Liability, and the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements. EU Regulations accommodate ranking problems by means
of disconnection clauses,137 the framing of which themselves display a certain
continuity, perhaps masking the complexity of situations to which they will be
called in aid. While this article has sought to examine the compatibility of the
EU Regulations inter se, their coexistence with Hague Conventions and other
instruments is a further dimension worthy of analysis. To provide comprehen-
sive advice would demand omniscience.
Though one must be alert to the hinterland, it can be concluded that the
trio of Regulations examined in this article constitutes an admirable body of
law, reﬁned over decades and sophisticated in its operation and cooperation,
beﬁtting the stage of development of harmonized rules of private international
law which Europe now has reached.
135 eg Catalyst Investment Group Ltd v Max Lewinsohn et al [2009] EWHC 1964 (Ch); and
Ferrexpo AG v Gilson Investments Ltd & ors [2012] EWHC 721 (Comm).
136 Regulation 1215, art 79.
137 eg Rome I Regulation, art 25; Rome II Regulation, art 28; and Regulation 1215, art 71.
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